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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
000O000

ARVILLA FINLAYSON,
Case No. 920411-CA

Plaintiff/Appellant,
Cross-Appellee,
VS.
ROGER FINLAYSON,
Defendant/Appellee,
Cross-Appellant.

Priority No. 16
•oooOooo-

PETITION FOR REHEARING
OF
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, CROSS-APPELLANT

APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF
DIVORCE OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE SENIOR JUDGE JOHN F.
WAHLQUIST, PRESIDING

SHARON A. DONOVAN, ESQ., 0901
KENT M. KASTING, ESQ., 1772
SHANNON W. CLARK, ESQ., 5678
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Cross-Appellee

MICHAEL A. KATZ, ESQ., 3817
PURSER & EDWARDS, L.L.C
39 Market Street
Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-3555
A t t o r n e y i ISr51 Defendant/
Appellee, Cross-Appellant
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Michael A. Katz, 3817
PURSER 6 EDWARDS, L.L.C
39 Market Street
Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2104
Telephone: (801) 532-3555
Attorneys for Appellee,
Cross-Appellant, Roger Finlayson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
ARVILLA FINLAYSON,
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Cross-Appellee,
VS.

Case No. 920411-CA

ROGER FINLAYSON,
Priority No. 16

Defendant/Appellee,
Cross-Appellant.
-oooOooo-

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Roger Finlayson, hereby submits his
Petition

for Rehearing

of the Court of Appeals decision in

Finlayson v. Finlayson. 237, Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah App. April 13,
1994) .
ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATION
By his signature below, Michael A. Katz, counsel for Roger
Finlayson, certifies that this Petition for Rehearing is presented
in good faith and not for purposes of delay.

ARGUMENT
The Court Overlooked or Misapprehended Facts and Law in
Arriving at its Opinion on the Appeal.
POINT I.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW, BOTH ON THIS PETITION

AND ON THE UNDERLYING APPEALS CALLS FOR A REHEARING AND
NEW DECISION IN THIS MATTER.
The standard by which the Court of Appeals assesses a petition
for rehearing is specifically set forth in Rule 35, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. It states, in pertinent part:

"The petition

shall state with particularity the points of law or fact which the
petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended and
shall contain such argument in support of the petition as the
petitioner desires" (emphasis added). Mr. Finlayson here contends
the Court of Appeals must again review but now uphold the trial
court's decision as to two key marital assets and/or liabilities,
to-wit:

(1) withdrawals from joint bank accounts to discharge the

"Hallmark Debt"; and (2) the Lot, and reverse as to a third, the
Rent Note.
This

Court

also

recently

reiterated

the

legal

standard

governing review of the trial court's rulings on property and debt
distribution.

The appellate court will only modify an award "if

there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting
in

substantial
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and

prejudicial
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error,

the

evidence

clearly

preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."
Watson. 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992).

Watson v.

In the context of this

Petition for Rehearing, it is respectfully urged that the Court of
Appeals overlooked or misapprehended points of law or fact under
the foregoing standard of review warranting the requested relief.
POINT II. THIS COURT MUST REVIEW ITS FINDINGS AS TO THE
HALLMARK DEBT.
Under the above standards, the most inconsistent and hence
susceptible to review portion of the Opinion was the finding that
a remand was appropriate for purposes of equitably reallocating
sums withdrawn from a joint account to repay the "Hallmark Debt."
Specifically, Petitioner here argues that the Court of Appeals
overlooked or misapprehended its own decisions in the recent cases
of Godfrey v. Godfrey. 854 P.2d 585 (Utah App. 1993) and Baker v.
Baker. 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App. 1993).
In Godfrey, the appellant/wife challenged the trial court's
finding that an obligation actually existed as against a marital
asset, much as Ms. Finlayson did with reference to the Hallmark
Debt and these parties' joint bank account. Although the Court of
Appeals vacated the trial court's finding in Godfrey, it did so on
the basis of inadequate findings and not because the court "abused
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its discretion" in permitting discharge of a marital obligation out
of marital assets as found here in the Finlayson appeal.
It is difficult to understand how the Court of Appeals found
an abuse of discretion by Judge Wahlquist in our case considering
the significantly broad discretion given the trial court in making
asset and debt allocations.
assessing

or

reducing

Noteworthy on our facts as involving

marital

assets

by

marital

debts

(as

accomplished by the trial court here) are Rasband v. Kasband, 752
P. 2d

1331

(Utah App. 1988)

(acknowledging

the trial

court's

considerable discretion in equitably adjusting the financial and
property interests of the parties); and Naranio v. Naranio, 751
P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988) wherein the court found also the
trier of fact's actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.
But, most compelling, is Baker v. Baker, supra.

Despite the

fact the loan in favor of a parent was not represented by a written
instrument nor admitted by the spouse (compare our facts, where
both

an

instrument

obligation),

the

exists

court

of

and

Ms.

appeals

Finlayson

upheld

the

admitted
trial

the

court's

determination that the funds were a loan, and therefore part of the
marital estate. Considering the more persuasive facts above noted
and present with reference to the Hallmark Debt, it seems clear
this Court overlooked its own recent opinion in Baker and must,
therefore, rehear this case.
94-092.1
2004004.mak
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A second facet of this Court1s ruling concerning the Hallmark
Debt supports Petitioner's contention that "points of law or fact"
were "overlooked or misapprehended" in the original opinion.
237,

At

Utah Adv. Rep. 25, Judge Davis notes Judge Wahlquist's

adequate findings of fact on the parties7 respective abilities to
support him or herself. Yet, on the way to finding the trial court
"abused its discretion in crediting husband's payments to Mina as
a discharge of a marital debt" the Court assails the inadequacy of
findings "regarding the propriety or effect of using liquid assets
of the marital estate to discharge the debt."

What additional

findings were required to support this distribution of marital
assets other than the parties' ability to support him or herself is
difficult to imagine. This portion of the appellate opinion serves
to highlight the inconsistency in treatment of the Hallmark Debt.
It is found to be a marital liability, yet a remand is ordered for
further distribution of the estate's liquid assets, including
amounts withdrawn by Petitioner from the joint account to pay this
indebtedness.
Finally,
discharge

the

in ordering
Hallmark

a reallocation

Debt,

this

Court

of amounts paid to
overlooks

the

key

admissions made by Ms. Finlayson during the trial of this action.
Not only did the Plaintiff acknowledge the underlying indebtedness,
she admitted requesting Mr. Finlayson to pay the same. She should
94-092.1
2004004.mak
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not now be heard to complain about an allocation of debts and
liabilities premised upon her husband simply carrying out these
wishes.

Whether this is phrased in terms of estoppel or not, it

presents another basis to rehear this appeal.
POINT III. THE "RENT NOTE" IS A MARITAL DEBT (SIMILAR TO
THE HALLMARK DEBT) AND THE COURT OF APPEALS MUST REVIEW
ITS RULING THEREON.
As argued extensively by this Petitioner in his opening brief
on the cross-appeal, it is difficult to reconcile Judge Wahlquist's
finding that the Hallmark Debt was marital, whereas the Rent Note
was not. The only distinction between the two is the fact that the
Hallmark Debt was traceable into the marriage's largest asset.
However, that distinction fails to account for the fact that the
parties

received

substantial

family

benefit

under

the

Rent

obligation in the form of housing.

Furthermore, Judge Wahlquist

found the Rent Note to be bona fide

as a matter of fact, yet was

precluded from finding it "unenforceable" as the Court correctly
observes, citing Qpenshaw v. Openshaw, 12 P.2d 364, 365 (Utah
1932).

We are thus left with another inconsistent ruling by the

Court of Appeals, albeit this time upholding a trial court ruling.
Again, there is a sound basis to rehear this appeal as to the
finding that the Rent Note is not a marital obligation.

94-092.1
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POINT IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED THE TRIAL
COURT'S DISPOSITION OF THE LOT AND MUST CORRECT ITS
OPINION.
In addressing the Court of Appeals' holding as to whether the
Lot was marital property, it is once again important to note the
standard of review. The Appeals Court may substitute its judgment
for

the

trial

court

only

if

an

abuse

of

discretion

or

misapplication of the law occurred or the trial court's award
worked a manifest injustice.
P.2d 779, 780 (Utah 1986).

See, gener al 1 y,

Gill v. Gill, 718

All the while, this Court must afford

the trial court considerable discretion and cloak its actions with
a presumption of validity.

Id.

In rejecting Judge Wahlquist's treatment of the Lot, the Court
of Appeals must surely have overlooked

or misapprehended the

thorough, comprehensive and well-supported
which

lip

service

Is

paid

at

23 7,

LLndings of fart to

Utah

Adv.

Rep.

|p

/6

Specified^*., Juage Davis in his opinion, apparently ignored the
wholesale absence of donative intent on the grantor/Mind's part
when she executed the subject deed.

Roger Finlayson, Mina's

grandson, Kurt, and Mina herself testified the deed was utilized
solely to assist i n sel 1 ing the property
R. 155-146. ) ,

(Find i ng of Fact 1,2 at

Also overlooked by the Court of Appeals were the

credible explanations as to the motivation behind payment of the
94-092.1
2004004.mak
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property taxes and other actions on Roger's part to maintain the
property.
The Court of Appeals must similarly have overlooked pertinent
legal authority which is even cited in the Finlavson appeal in
rejecting the quit-claim deed ordered by Judge Wahlquist. Jackson
v. Jacksonr 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980), stands for the proposition
that the trial court may compel such conveyances as are incident to
property distributions.

And, the Court of Appeals must have

misapprehended the import of Openshaw (cited at 237, Utah Adv.
Rep., 26) in stating Judge Wahlquist was powerless in ordering the
parties to execute the quit-claim deed to Mina1.

While Mina's

absence as a party to the action prohibits a finding that her debt
is unenforceable, this is quite different from ordering the two
parties to these proceedings to execute a quit-claim deed to one of
their parents.

In the former

instance, the Court would be

prejudicing a non-party, whereas in the latter, the Court is simply
entering an order needed to implement its finding the Lot was not
a marital asset.
In closing, and without belaboring the appropriate standard of
appellate review identified above, Petitioner wishes to emphasize
1

Openshaw. supra, is distinguishable as it involved
ordering one party to the divorce to pay the spouse's attorney's
fees directly to her counsel, rather than through the traditional
means of a money judgment in the amount thereof.
94-092.1
2004004.mak
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an

important

yet

somewhat

intangible

principle

overriding

a11

f a c e t s of J u d g e W a h l q u i s t ' s d i s t r i b u t i o n of a s s e t s and l i a b i l i t i e s
in this action,,

Tl it principle

is equity

Because the triaJ

court

m a d e e x t e n s i v e , d e t a i l e d f i n d i n g s of fact s u p p o r t i n g e a c h a n d every
conclusion

of

lam

after

hearing

conflicting

and

contentious

testi m o n y by the p. = xti es ai id other w i t n e s s e s , t h e Court

of AppcM Is

is i l l - s u i t e d t o s u b s t i t u t e its d e c i s i o n for t h a t of t h e learned
and e x p e r i e n c e d t r i a l judge,

She

should

not continue

T h e subject d e b t s w e r e a d m i t t e d by

to benefit

F i n l a y s o n s h o u l d e r s alJ t h e i r b u r d e n s .
^ Judge

Wall J q u i s t ' s

nil ings

and

from

the assets

while

Mr.

T h i s n o t i o n w a s i m p l i c i t in
cannot

be

"over] ool :ed

:: u:

m i s a p p r e h e n d e d " b y t h e Court of A p p e a l s .
CONCLUSION
Based

01 i tl: le f o r e g o i n g ,

Petitioner

respectful ] y r e q u e s t s

r e h e a r i n g of t h e a p p e a l .

DATED this *2H day

A t t o r n e y s for
Roger Finlayson

94-092.1
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a

CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the

2^

of May, 1994, the

foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING was served by depositing copies
thereof in the United States mails, first class postage prepaid, to
the following:
Sharon A. Donovan, Esq.
Kent M. Kasting, Esq.
Shannon W. Clark, Esq.
Dart, Adamson & Donq
310 South Main,
Salt Lake City
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